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Cancer evolution and progression are shaped by cellular interactions and
Darwinian selection. Evolutionary game theory incorporates both of these
principles, and has been proposed as a framework to understand tumour cell
population dynamics. A cornerstone of evolutionary dynamics is the replicator
equation, which describes changes in the relative abundance of different cell
types, and is able to predict evolutionary equilibria. Typically, the replicator
equation focuses on differences in relative fitness.We here show that this frame-
work might not be sufficient under all circumstances, as it neglects important
aspects of population growth. Standard replicator dynamics might miss criti-
cal differences in the time it takes to reach an equilibrium, as this time also
depends on cellular turnover in growing but bounded populations. As the
system reaches a stable manifold, the time to reach equilibrium depends on
cellular death and birth rates. These rates shape the time scales, in particular,
in coevolutionary dynamics of growth factor producers and free-riders. Repli-
cator dynamics might be an appropriate framework only when birth and
death rates are of similar magnitude. Otherwise, population growth effects
cannot be neglected when predicting the time to reach an equilibrium, and
cell-type-specific rates have to be accounted for explicitly.1. Introduction
The theory of games was devised by von Neumann & Morgenstern [1], and
according to Aumann [2], game theory is an ‘interactive decision theory’, where
an agent’s best strategy depends on her expectations on the actions chosen by
other agents, and vice versa. As a result, ‘the outcomes in question might have
been intended by none of the agents’ [3]. To rank and order strategies, and to opti-
mize individual payoffs, different systems to systematically identify equilibria
have been defined. Most famously, the Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies
such that no single agent can improve by switching to another strategy [4]. This
concept includes mixed equilibria, which describe probability distributions over
strategies. Such equilibrium concepts in game theory cover various kinds of pat-
terns of play, i.e. simultaneous, non-simultaneous and asymmetric strategies [5].
This rich and complex framework allows for a wide application of game theory
beyond economics, famously in ecology and evolution [6]. In biological context,
and especially in evolutionary game theory, the focus has been on simultaneous
and symmetric strategic interactions in evolving populations [7].
Evolutionary game theory replaces the idea of choice and rationality by
concepts of reproduction and selection in a population of evolving individuals
[8] and was conceived to study animal conflict [9]. Behavioural phenotypes are
hardwired to heritable genotypes. Without the possibility of spontaneous
mutation events, offspring carry the parent strategy. Evolutionary games have
also been used extensively to study learning and pairwise comparison-based
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2changes in strategy abundance in populations of potentially
erroneous players [10–12].
Selection in evolutionary games is based on the assumption
that payoff translates intoDarwinian fitness,which is ameasure
for an individual’s contribution to the pool of offspring in the
future. Complex deterministic dynamical systems arise when
one considers very large populations of reproducing individ-
uals. The most prominent example for such a system is the
replicator equation [13], which focuses on the relative abun-
dance of each strategy. The replicator equation does not model
population growth specifically, but rather describes changes in
relative abundances. Existence and stability of fixed points in
these dynamical systems depend on the payoffs [14], and on
the choice of fitness function [15]. In the study of animal behav-
iour, the precise measurements of payoffs, as observed from
individuals’ behaviours, is difficult. Milinski et al. [16] deter-
mined all but one payoff parameter precisely, in order to
observe tit-for-tat strategies in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games in fish. Kerr et al. showed that Escherichia coli bacteria
can be observed to evolve according to rock–paper–scissors
type of interactions, if cellular dispersal is minimal. A recent
expansion of interesting theoretical considerations that apply
evolutionary games to biology [17] occurred because of the abil-
ity to assess many problems in ecological and evolutionary
populationdynamics at least in qualitative terms, i.e. bypredict-
ing and ranking evolutionary equilibria, how population-wide
coexistence can emerge from apparent individual conflict, or
how fast transitions between equilibria occur.
Tumour cell populations, including cells of the tumour
microenvironment, are part of a complex ecosystem [18],
which can have consequences for therapeutic outcomes [19].
At the same time, it has been more widely recognized that
Darwinian selection plays a key role in cancer [20]. Given the
appreciated amount of both genetic and phenotypic heterogen-
eity in tumour cell populations [21], evolutionary games have
become more widely used as a means to theoretically model
tumour evolution, especially after tumour initiation [22].
Prominent examples of recent applications of replicator
equations in cancer are concernedwith the avoidance of the tra-
gedy of the commons, where a sub-population of tumour cells
produces a ‘tumour public good’ in form of an insulin-like
growth factor [23], in form of glycolytic acid and vascular
endothelial growth factor [24], or modelling the dynamic equi-
librium between lactate respiration and glycolysis in tumour
cells [25]. Such non-autonomous effects between tumour
cells had been proposed some time ago [26], and non-cell-
autonomous growth rates were recently measured empirically
[27]. Similar findings and future challenges in this field have
been summarized by Tabassum & Polyak [18].
We here focus on the time it takes to reach an equilibrium in
different approaches to model deterministic evolutionary
game dynamics. In particular, we focus on differences between
logistic growth and the replicator dynamics. We show that the
time to get arbitrarily close to an equilibrium, which we here
call the 1-fixation time, might critically depend on the under-
lying cellular birth and death rates. We focus on two
coevolving tumour cell populations, and present a discussion
of the dynamics between growth factor producers C1 and
free-riding non-producers C2. In the simplest setting, we can
assume that these closely related cell types experience popu-
lation doubling rate a, and that the tumour public good,
produced by C1 cells, has a linear positive effect on cellular
birth rates in form the additive benefit that scales with thedoubling rate ba, but bears a production cost k. The respective
game can be recast in the payoff matrix
C1 C2
C1
C2
aþ ba k a k
aþ ba a
 
:
ð1:1Þ
We assume that the linear benefit of the public good arises
through growth factor diffusion that occurs on a time scale
much faster than the average times between cell divisions. In
a well-mixed population with fraction u of C1 cells, the fitness
functions of this simple game are then be given by
f1(u) ¼ a(1þ b u) k
and f2(u) ¼ a(1þ b u):
)
ð1:2Þ
Our analysis in this paper is based on cell-type-specific dou-
bling rates, and in the case of logistic growth, also on the
apoptotic rates.We are interested in the question of when repli-
cator dynamics, that typically only models changes in relative
abundance as a result of fitness differences f1(u)2 f2(u), pre-
dicts similar 1-fixation times as a logistic growth dynamics,
and when this is not the case. The main idea is that the replica-
tor dynamics neglects apoptotic rates, but that these rates in
turn influence the time to reach an equilibrium in a co-growing
and coevolving heterogeneous cell population.2. Methods
In this section, we introduce our model of bounded frequency-
dependent growth. We define our basic deterministic framework
of two co-growing cancer cell populations, derive dynamic
equations for the fraction of one clone and the total size of the
population, and then derive an expression for the stable manifold
of the system.2.1. Logistic growth model
The population is assumed to consist of two types, and we denote
their absolute numbers by x1 and x2. The carrying capacity is
denoted by K, which we consider to be a constant. It is possible
to model it as a function of the strategies present in the population
[28,29]. The growth rate of each type is assumed to depend on the
fraction of type 1 cells u ¼ x1/(x1 þ x2) according to growth func-
tions f1(u) for type 1 and f2(u) for type 2. Lastly, cells of both
types die at a constant rate m. Taken together this implies that we
get the following system of coupled logistic equations that describe
co-growth and coevolution of the two cell types:
dx1(t)
dt
¼ f1(u)x1 1 x1 þ x2K
 
 m1x1
and
dx2(t)
dt
¼ f2(u)x2 1 x1 þ x2K
 
 m2x2,
9>=
>; ð2:1Þ
defined for x1,x2 [ Rþ. In the following analysis, we first assume
m1,2 ¼ m and f1,2(u). m for u[ [0, 1], i.e. the net growth rate of
both cells types will always be positive. In the second part of the
discussion, we will relax the assumption of equal rates and turn
to the more general case of a1= a2, m1= m2, as we analyse the
system implementing previously measured cellular rates of pro-
liferation and apoptosis. Note that the logistic growth model
emerges from a spatial setting that includes cell movement if cell
migration occurs on a much faster time scale compared to cell div-
ision. It has been shown that in this case spatial correlations are
negligible and the population dynamics can be described using a
logistic growth equation [30]. In this parameter regime, it is also
justified to assume that interactions that influence the rate of cell
r3division become independent of specific local configurations, and
depend solely on the frequency of different cell types.sif.royalsocietypublishing.org
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To simplify the analysis of the system (2.1), we apply the
following change of variables:
u ¼ x1
x1 þ x2
and s ¼ x1 þ x2,
9=
; ð2:2Þ
where u is the fraction of type 1 cells and s is the total population
size. By differentiating u and s with respect to time we obtain the
following system of ODEs:
du
dt
¼ (f1(u) f2(u))u(1 u) 1 sK
 
and
ds
dt
¼ (f1(u) f2(u))su 1 sK
 
þ f2(u)s 1 sK
 
 ms,
9>=
>;
ð2:3Þ
defined on u[ [0, 1] and s [ Rþ. We note that in the case when s
is small compared with the carrying capacity K, such that s/K  0
the system reduces to
du
dt
¼ (f1(u) f2(u))u(1 u)
and
ds
dt
¼ f1(u)suþ f2(u)s(1 u) ms,
9>=
>; ð2:4Þ
and we see that the equation for u is independent of the popu-
lation size s and that u changes according to the standard
replicator equation [13,14]. We will now proceed to a more gen-
eral analysis of our model.2.2.1. Fixed points
By solving the equations
(f1(u) f2(u))u(1 u) 1 sK
 
¼ 0
and (f1(u) f2(u))su 1 sK
 
þ f2(u)s 1 sK
 
 ms ¼ 0,
9>=
>;
ð2:5Þ
we see that for all growth functions f1 and f2 the system has the
following set of fixed points on the boundary (see appendix A
for details):
(1) (u1, s1) ¼ (0, 0) with corresponding eigenvalues l1 ¼ f1(0) 2
f2(0) and l2 ¼ f2(0) 2 m. 0, which is unconditionally
unstable,
(2) (u2, s2) ¼ (1, 0) with corresponding eigenvalues l1 ¼ f1(1) 2
f2(1) and l2 ¼ f1(1) 2 m. 0, which is unconditionally
unstable,
(3) (u3, s3) ¼ (0, K(12 m/f2(0)) with corresponding eigenvalues
l1 ¼ (m/f2(0))( f1(0) 2 f2(0)) and l2 ¼ m 2 f2(0) , 0, which is
stable iff f1(0) , f2(0), and
(4) (u4, s4) ¼ (1, K(12 m/f1(1)) with corresponding eigenvalues
l1 ¼ (m/f1(1))( f2(1) 2 f1(1)) and l2 ¼ m 2 f1(1) , 0, which is
stable iff f2(1) , f1(1).
Here, fixed points 1 and 2 are trivial in the sense that they
correspond to a system void of cells. Fixed points 3 and 4 corre-
spond to monoclonal populations and are stable if the resident
type has a larger growth rate compared with the invading type.
If there are points u*[ (0, 1) such that f1(u*) ¼ f2(u*), then
these give rise to fixed points (u*,K(1 2 m/( f1(u*)u* þ f2(u*)(1 2
u*)))), which are stable if f 01(u*)2 f 02(u*) , 0 (see appendix A for
proof).
We note that the stability criteria for the non-trivial fixed
points at u ¼ 0 and 1, including potential internal fixed points,are identical to those of the two-type replicator equation with
payoff functions f1 and f2.
2.2.2. Invariant manifold
We now focus our attention to the dynamics when the system is
close to saturation (s  K ) with the aim of obtaining a simpler
description of how the frequency u(t) changes in time. This can
be achieved since the phase space contains a stable invariant mani-
fold that connects all the non-trivial steady states. The invariant
manifold is simply a curve s ¼ h(u), which attracts the dynamics
and once the system enters the manifold it will not leave it.
This implies that the dynamics along the manifold is effectively
one-dimensional, and can be captured with a single ODE for u(t).
If we write the invariant manifold as a function s ¼ h(u),
then, since it is invariant it must be tangent to the vector field
(du/dt, ds/dt) at every point. This implies the condition
ds
dt
¼ h0(u) du
dt
ð2:6Þ
which is known as the manifold equation [14,31]. By substituting
du/dt and ds/dt from (2.3) and letting s ¼ h(u), we obtain the
following equation for h(u):
ð f1ðuÞ  f2ðuÞÞhðuÞu 1 hðuÞK
 
þ f2ðuÞhðuÞ 1 hðuÞK
 
 mhðuÞ
¼ h0ðuÞ ð f1ðuÞ  f2ðuÞÞuð1 uÞ 1 hðuÞK
  
:
This equation is a nonlinear ordinary differential equation
and in order to solve it we express h(u) as a series expansion in
the death rate m, which typically is a small parameter
h(u) ¼
X1
i¼0
ai(u)mi, ð2:7Þ
where ai(u) are coefficients that depend on u. We insert
this ansatz into equation (2.6) and equate powers of m to
solve for the ai’s. We do this for i ¼ 0, 1, 2, introduce
f (u) ¼ uf1(u)þ (1 u)f2(u), and get
a0ðuÞ ¼K,
a1ðuÞ ¼  Kuf1ðuÞ þ ð1 uÞf2ðuÞ ¼ 
K
f ðuÞ
and a2ðuÞ ¼Kuð1 uÞð f1ðuÞ  f2ðuÞÞð f1ðuÞÞf ðuÞ4
þ uf
0
1ðuÞ þ ð1 uÞf 02ðuÞÞ  f2ðuÞ
f ðuÞ4 :
Numerical comparison shows that the invariant manifold is closely
approximated by the first two terms, and we therefore drop all
higher order terms and approximate the invariant manifold with
~h(u) ¼ K 1 mf (u)
 
: ð2:8Þ
Note here that the complete solution would be more complicated,
as can be seen from the fact that this first order expression does not
solve the original manifold equation.
The dynamics along the invariant manifold are given by
replacing swith ~h(u) in (2.3), and we get the following expression
(to first order in m):
du
dt
¼ ð f1ðuÞ  f2ðuÞÞuð1 uÞ 1 SK
 
¼ mf ðuÞ ð f1ðuÞ  f2ðuÞÞuð1 uÞ: ð2:9Þ
With the unusual prefactor that is inversely proportional to the
total fitness of the population, f (u), this equation for the
rsif.royalsocie
4frequency of type 1 cells is similar to the version of the replicator
equation introduced my Maynard-Smith [32], and the one
derived by Traulsen et al. [33] (if we disregard the demographic
noise term). The difference compared to previous derivations is
the factor m, which implies that the rate of change of u along
the invariant manifold is proportional to the death rate. typublishing.org
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It is often argued that prefactors to the replicator equation are
irrelevant since the dynamic flow and fixed points remain
unchanged. However, the time scale of selection leading to
an equilibrium might be altered. In this section, we explore
the difference between the standard replicator equation and
the logistic model considered here. We examine this relation-
ship in the context of a tumour public goods game, in which
some cells produce a public good at a cost, rendering a
benefit to all cells in the population.
3.1. Diffusing public goods game
Autocrine production of growth factors is a common feature of
cancer cells, and has previously beenmodelled using evolution-
ary game theory [23,34]. Let us now consider two cell types that
only differ in one aspect. Type 1 cells produce growth factor at a
cost k. Type 2 cells do not produce the growth factor and are
termed free-riders. Otherwise, both cell types have the same
growth rates, which are a linear function of growth factor avail-
ability. We assume that the growth factor production rate is
given by r and that the growth factor is bound and internalized
by both cell types at rate d.
Two largely simplifying assumptions are that, first, we are
describing a well-mixed system and that, second, the growth
factor concentration G is assumed to be uniform in space. We
rely on the first assumption for mathematical convenience, as
otherwise we would have to resort to non-analytical, agent-
based or hybrid modelling [35]. Secondly, additional growth
factor provision was shown to be rapid and leading to high
levels of tumour public good, provided that the respective gen-
etic promoter was strong [27]. In a similar study by Cleary et al.
[36],who studiedWnt1-based cooperative tumourevolutionary
dynamics, aberrant expression of the cooperative signalling
molecule was observed on a tumour wide scale. Thus, under
these simplifying but productive assumptions, the growth
factor dynamics obeys the equation
dGðtÞ
dt
¼ rx1  dGðx1 þ x2Þ:
Further, we assume that the growth factor dynamics occur
on a fast time scale compared to changes in x1 and x2. This
implies that
dGðtÞ
dt
¼ rx1  dGðx1 þ x2Þ  0
and we can solve for G to give
G ¼ b x1
x1 þ x2 ¼ bu,
where b ¼ r/d. For simplicity, we first consider a linear effect of
the growth factor on the rate of cell division, as well as equal
proliferation and death rates, which results in the growth func-
tions given by equations (1.2). In order for the growth rate to be
larger than the death rate for all uwe assume the inequalitya2
k. m. This choice of growth functions gives the followingsystem of ODEs for the frequency of producers u and the total
population size s:
du
dt
¼ ku(1 u) 1 s
K
 
and
ds
dt
¼ ksu 1 s
K
 
þ a(1þ bu)s 1 s
K
 
 ms:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
ð3:1Þ
This system results from equations (2.3) and has two non-trivial
steady states given by a monomorphic population of free-
riders (0, 12 m/a), and a population consisting only of
producers (1, 12 m/(a(1 þ b)2 k)); see analysis following
equations (2.5). The eigenvalues are
l1 ¼ m a , 0 ð3:2Þ
and
l2 ¼  km
a
, 0 ð3:3Þ
and hence the free-rider steady state is stable. For the other fixed
point (producers dominate), we have
l1 ¼ km
a(1þ b) k . 0 ð3:4Þ
and
l2 ¼ kþ m a(1þ b) , 0, ð3:5Þ
making it unstable. Figure 1a shows the phase space of the
system, where the open circles indicate unstable steady states
and the filled circle shows the location of the single stable
steady state. We note that for almost all initial conditions the
dynamics rapidly converge to the invariant manifold (2.8)
which is approximately given by
~h(u) ¼ K 1 mf(u)
 
¼ K 1 m
a(1þ bu) ku
 
: ð3:6Þ
Once the system enters the invariantmanifold the dynamics can
be approximated by (2.9) which for the diffusing public goods
game considered here are given by
du
dt
  mk
a(1þ bu) ku u(1 u): ð3:7Þ
Thus, in order to assess the impact of cell death and turnover on
selection,we compare our description of the public goods game
(3.1) with the standard replicator equation
du
dt
¼ (f1(u) f2(u))u(1 u) ¼ ku(1 u): ð3:8Þ
Figure 1b shows a comparison between the solution of the logis-
tic system (3.1) and the replicator equation (3.8) for the same
initial condition u0 ¼ 0.75 (s0 ¼ 0.01K) and with a death rate
of m ¼ 0.1 h21. Whereas the two solutions agree for small
times (when sK), they start to diverge as soon as the solution
to the logistic system enters the invariantmanifold. The solution
of the replicator equation quickly converges to the steady state
u ¼ 0, while the fraction of producers in the logistic case
decreases approximately linearly with time.
To quantify the effect of the death rate m on the rate of
selection we measured the time it takes for the logistic
system to approach a steady state. For a fixed initial condition
(u0, s0) ¼ (0.75, 0.01), we measured the time it took for the
system to reach a small 1 neighbourhood of the fixed point,
i.e. ju(t) 2 u*j  1, with u* ¼ 0 and 1 ¼ 0.01. We call this
time the 1-fixation time. All other parameters were fixed at
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Figure 1. (a) Phase space of the ODE system (3.1) describing the diffusing
public goods game. The grey arrows show the flow lines of the system, the
open circles show the three unstable stationary states and the filled circle
shows the only stable steady state where the population is dominated by
non-producing type 2 cells. The red line shows the invariant manifold
(3.6), and the light blue curve (with arrow pointing forward in time)
shows one solution of the deterministic system as it approaches and even-
tually follows the stable manifold. (b) The frequency of producers u(t)
obtained from the logistic system and the standard replicator equation
(the line is just a guide to the eye). (c) The 1-fixation time measured as
the time it takes to reach the state u ¼ 0.001. In all panels, the values
are a ¼ 1.0, b ¼ 1.0, k ¼ 0.1, K ¼ 1 and m ¼ 0.1 (a,b), where
we chose to observe time in units of hours (h). The initial conditions
are (u0, s0) ¼ (0.75, 0.01K ).
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5a ¼ b ¼ 1, k ¼ 0.1, m ¼ 0.1 and K ¼ 1. The result is displayed
in figure 1c and shows that the 1-fixation time scales as m21.
This implies that for small m the time it takes the system to
reach the steady state can be exceedingly long. It is worth
noting that the 1-fixation time for the replicator equationcan be obtained in the limit of m! f(u), performed on the
logistic system, implying a never-growing population, in
which the death rate equals the average birth rate.
3.2. Time scales of in vivo and in vitro cellular
expansions
Previous studies of ecological interactions in growing tumour
cell populations have observed various forms of frequency-
dependent effects. These effects have then been linked to
the persistence of distinct cancer cell lines that provide
growth enhancing public goods to the tumour, most notably
in experimental work by Marusyk et al. [27]. There, it could
be shown that a mixture of certain clones could not explain
tumour outgrowth in vivo by simply using superposition of
individual clonal birth and death rates. Rather, synergistic
tumour-driving effects can emerge, pointing to more intri-
cate, potentially frequency-dependent growth effects, based
on direct or indirect clonal interactions [18]. For the purpose
of illustration, we extracted individual clonal proliferation (ai)
and death rates (mi) from Marusyk et al. [27], in order to pre-
dict how these rates shape the dynamics. Out of 16 clonal cell
lines, each distinctively expressing a different gene, we chose
four clones to calculate baseline cellular birth and death rates.
The four clones, derived from the breast cancer cell line
MDA-MB-468, were LoxL3 (lysyl oxidase type 3 [37], linked
to breast cancer invasion and metastasis), IL11 (interleukin
11, a member of the IL 6 family that plays a multifaceted
role in leukemia and breast cancer [38]), and CCL5 (C-C
motif ligand 5, a chemokine with emerging roles in immu-
notherapy [39]). The baseline cellular birth and death rates
of these clones were calculated in the following way, based
on in vivo growth experiments, originally performed in a
mouse xenograft model (tumours formed by orthotopic
trans-plantation into the mammary fat pads of immunodefi-
cient Foxn1nu (nu) mice [27]). For all four clones, it was
established that tumours grew exponentially; from longitudi-
nal measurements and associated cellularity calculations, the
net cellular doubling rates were calculated (see Ext. Data
fig. 3 and SI in [27], where exponential growth rates are
given, which we transformed into doubling rates). For the
four above mentioned clones, proliferation assays were also
performed (Ext. Data fig. 1 in [27]). These BrdU staining
experiments measure the fraction of cells in S-phase of the
cell cycle, x. S-phase duration TS is highly conserved in mam-
mary cells [40], known to be approximately 8 h long, x serves
as a direct estimate for the per cent of S-phase in relation to
the whole cell cycle T, and thus the doubling rate, which
we set to a ¼ 1/T. Using the relation
x ¼ TS
T
, ð3:9Þ
we calculated the monoclonal birth rates using
a ¼ x
TS
: ð3:10Þ
Thus, given the net doubling rate r ¼ a2 m, it is possible to
estimate the death rate
m ¼ x
TS
 r, ð3:11Þ
withTS fixed to 8 h.Data for r and x are given in appendix B.As
for both r and x, several independent measurements were per-
formed, andwe calculated distributions ofa andm for the three
IL11 & LoxL3, replicator
IL11 & CCL5, replicator
IL11 & LoxL3, logistic
IL11 & CCL5, logistic
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
10
102
103
cost of growth factor production k (d–1)
cost of growth factor production k (d–1)
IL11 & LoxL3, numerical
IL11 & CCL5, numerical
IL11 & LoxL3, analytical
IL11 & CCL5, analytical
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
10
102
103
(c)
death birth
LoxL3
death birth
IL11
death birth
CCL5
death birth
in vitro cell line
0
0.5
1.0
1.5
m
o
n
o
cl
on
al
 ra
te
 (d
–
1 )
(a)
(b)
e-
fix
at
io
n 
tim
e 
(da
ys
)
e-
fix
at
io
n 
tim
e 
(da
ys
)
Figure 2. (a) Birth and death rate distributions, calculated from previous
experiments, where engineered breast cancer cell lines, characterized over-
expressing certain cytokines, were observed to grow in in vivo xenograft
mouse model tumours [27]. Although net tumour growth was high, death
and birth rates were similar in all clones considered. In comparison, we
also show in vitro cell line rates, estimated by Juarez et al. [41]. We further
used the fact that the IL11 cells are growth factor producers. (b) Using
median birth and death rates from the distributions in (a), we measured
the 1-fixation time numerically determined using equations (3.13) (defined
as the time to reach an 1-neighbourhood equilibrium value of u, with 1 ¼
0.001, u0 ¼ 0.5) and compared it to the 1-fixation time of the standard
replicator equation (3.8). Note that we used equations (3.13) for this numeri-
cal procedure. For IL11, we used a1 ¼ 0.684 d21 and m1 ¼ 0.596 d21. For
LoxL3, we used a1 ¼ 0.617 d21 and m1 ¼ 0.515 d21. For CCL5, we used
a1 ¼ 1.214 d21 and m1 ¼ 1.031 d21. b ¼ 1, with u0 ¼ 0.5 and s0 ¼
0.01/K. Note here that the peak in 1-fixation time marks the shift from
u ! 1 to u! 0 as the cost increases; this transition can only occur
when producers and non-producers have similar birth and death rates.
(c) Comparison of 1-fixation times determined numerically using (3.13) to
the analytical approximation (3.19), parameters the same as in (b). Time
was measured in units of days (d).
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6cell lines described above. We contrasted these distributions to
in vitro distributions of cellular birth and death rates, adapted
from [41] (fig. 3 therein), which are, notably, very similar to
other in vitro values, e.g. reported for the PC-9 non-small cell
lung cancer cell line [42] (figure 2a). In the in vivo tumour
growth experiments, exponential growth was observed
within the time frame of 50–80 days, at growth rates up to
two population doublings per day (net growth rate) [27]. How-
ever, in most tumours the net growth rate was more moderate,and the actual cellular birth and death rates were at least of
similar order in magnitude (a/m  1). This stands in contrast
with the birth–death rate ratios observed in cell cultures,
where birth rates often exceed death rates by an order of
magnitude (a/m  10) [41–44].
As a notable difference to the previous section, here we
assume both a1= a2 and m1= m2. Thus, instead of (2.3),
we now deal with the more general payoff structure
C1 C2
C1
C2
a1ð1þ bÞ  k a1  k
a2ð1þ bÞ a2
  ð3:12Þ
and obtain the following ODEs for frequency of producer
cells and total size of the system:
du
dt
¼ ((a1  a2)(1þ bu) k)u(1 u) 1 sK
 
and
ds
dt
¼ ((a1  a2)(1þ bu) k)su 1 sK
 
þ a2(1þ bu)s 1 sK
 
 s(um1 þ (1 u)m2)
9>>>>>>=
>>>>>>;
ð3:13Þ
and we seek to estimate the time it takes to reach a small 1
neighbourhood of the equilibrium ju(t) 2 u*j  1, shown in
figure 2b. The combination of IL11 with one other cell line
was chosen because it has been established that IL11 is a
growth factor producer clone, which, at least in a first approxi-
mation, renders a linear fitness benefit [27]. We here make the
additional assumption that IL11 cells carry a cost associated
with growth factor production, and explore the extinction pro-
cess of IL11 cells as they compete with either CCL5 or LoxL3
cells (figure 2).
We can calculate an estimate of the ‘time to fixation’ in the
following way. Suppose the fraction of growth factor produ-
cers, u, is at a stable equilibrium, and that there are only two
possible stable equilibria, u* ¼ 0 and u* ¼ 1. Then, the
stationary solutions for the population size, s*(u*), will be
s0 ¼ s(u ¼ 0) ¼ K 1
m2
a2
 
ð3:14Þ
and
s1 ¼ s(u ¼ 1) ¼ K 1
m1
a1(1þ b) k
 
: ð3:15Þ
We now assume that the total population size remains at the
stationary value, although it in fact changes (slightly) with u.
This assumption can be thought of as a zeroth-order approxi-
mation in 12 s/K, and it implies that near the stable
manifold, the frequency u obeys the ODE
du
dt
¼ ((a1  a2)(1þ bu) k)u(1 u) 1
s0,1
K
 
, ð3:16Þ
which we can solve by inserting the approximations (3.14)
and (3.15) into the ODE (3.16) and get the two solutions
(for two different possible endpoints)
v0(t) ¼ 1
1þ (1=u0  1) em2(a1a2k)t=a2
ð3:17Þ
and
v1(t) ¼ 1
1þ (1=u0  1) em1(a1a2k)t=a1(1þb)k
: ð3:18Þ
replicator dynamics
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Figure 3. (a) Comparing the influence of the death rate of producers m1 with the influence of the death rate of non-producers m2. (b) Variation of the extinction
time of growth factor producers under different death rates m1 and m2, u0 ¼ 0.8. In all panels, k ¼ 0.2, b ¼ 1, a1,2 ¼ 1.0 d21, s0 ¼ 0.01K and K ¼ 1. The
times here were calculated by numerical integration of equations (3.13). An observation that cannot be explained with our analytical approximations is that the
extinction times of the logistic growth dynamics tend to be closer to the (short) extinction times of the replicator dynamics for smaller death rate m1 (m2 fixed).
However, the utility of our approximations is supported by the observation that overall variability in 1-fixation times is driven by m2, the death rate of the dominant
cell type. Time was measured in units of days (d).
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7We now seek solutions of jv0,1(t) 2 u*0,1j  1 for t (with the
equilibrium points u*0 ¼ 0, u*1 ¼ 1), and find the following
relations that approximate the 1-fixation times:
tu!0  a2
m2(a1  a2  k)
log
u0(1 1)
1(1 u0)
 

and tu!1  a1(1þ b) k
m1(a1  a2  k)
log
(1 u0)(1 1)
1 u0
 
,
9>>=
>>;
ð3:19Þ
where u0 is the initial frequency. Note that here, we deviate
from the notion of (average) fixation times in the strict
stochastic sense [45], and replace the term by a threshold-
based analytical approximation. Especially in a population
that has reached the stable manifold, even a small fraction
of remaining producer cells could still mean that there are
as many cells as needed to warrant a mean field rather
than a fully stochastic description.
For the u! 0, s! K(12 m2/a2) case, we can now compare
our analytical approximations with the 1-fixation times of the
full numerical solution in figure 2c, as a function of k. Depend-
ing on the differences in clonal birth and death rates, the
approximation exhibits qualitative differences. Equation (3.19)
consistently overestimates the 1-fixation time if the death rate
of the producer cells is lower than that of non-producers (IL11
with CCL5, a12 m1, a22 m2), but it underestimates the
1-fixation time if the net growth rate of the producer cells is
higher than that of non-producers as long as the cost of
growth factor production does not exceed a certain threshold
(IL11 with LoxL3, a12 m1  a22 m2). Hence, not only the
cost of growth factor production factor influences the time to
extinction of producer cells, but also the monoclonal net
growth rate influences both the time to extinction of producers
and the impact of an assumed cost associated with growth
factor production. The approximations (3.19) are of ‘zero-
order’ in changes in s. Yet, they are still able to reflect the
basic fact that 1-fixation time can be heavily influenced by
the cellular death rate of the abundant cell type. According toour rough approximation, the extinction time of producer
cells (3.19) is both proportional to the ratio of birth to death
rate of the non-producers, as well as inversely proportional to
the birth rate difference. Surprisingly, in this approximation
tu!0 does not depend on the absorption or production rate of
the growth factor, captured by b. Large differences in baseline
birth rates extend growth factor producer extinction times. For
larger values of a2/m2, the extinction time is less sensitive to
changes in the cost of growth factor production.
The two cellular death rates m1 and m2 have different
effects on 1-fixation times. We used numerical solutions
of the full system (3.13), in comparison to the replicator
equation (3.8), to analyse variability of 1-fixation times (extinc-
tion of growth factor producer cells) under variable individual
death rates. Thereby, we recover that higher total death rate
speeds up the 1-fixation time across different initial conditions
(figure 3a), and that the death rate of the ‘winner-clone’ plays a
more important role (figure 3b): m2 has a more pronounced
impact on the 1-fixation time of non-producers. This might
be connected to the fact that apoptosis-driven cell turnover of
the nearly dominant cell type (i.e. the non-producer cells) gov-
erns the 1-fixation time. In accordance with this observation,
the stable manifold is itself governed by the apoptotic rate of
the dominant clone; compare to equation (2.8).4. Summary and conclusion
We here have presented calculations that were concerned with
the stability and time to reach a neighbourhood of equilibrium
points in evolutionary game dynamics between two types of
tumour cells. We focused on the dynamics of a tumour
public good (tumour growth factor), in which we assumed
linear fitness functions of growth factor producers and non-
producers. The fitness function linearly depends on the relative
abundance of growth factor producers, and production comes
at a cost. We did not assume that the evolving population was
at carrying capacity, as reflected in the logistic growth model.
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8Thus, in general, population expansion and cellular birth as
well as death rates are of importance for the time the system
takes to equilibrate. The standard replicator equation typically
rules out explicit death effects, and thusmay not accommodate
the impact of these death rates on the time to reach a population
equilibrium.
The use of replicator equations and birth–death processes
assume constant population size [7] or a population which is
growing uniformly, for example, at an exponential rate [13].
These assumptions have led to a plethora of fruitful results in
evolutionary game theory [46], e.g. to the ability to understand
fixation and extinction times in evolutionary 2  2-games
[47–50], multiplayer games [51], structured populations [52]
or bi-stable allelic competition [53,54]. Evolutionary games
have also been used to establish rules for equilibrium selection
even in complex group-coordination games [55,56], in chemical
game theory [57], and to map complex tumour dynamics
[23–25,34,58–61]. However, the assumption that the popu-
lation is either at constant size may be limiting, as also
recently discussed by Li et al. [62] in the context of co-growing
and coevolving bacterial species. Instead, the near-equilibrium
population size and the time to reach equilibria are influenced
directly by birth and death rates in the population.
We show that, for small differences between the birth and
death rates, the eco-evolutionary dynamics of the mixture of
two clones may be approximated by standard replicator
dynamics. Analysis of previously established growth factor-
dependent tumour dynamics of in vivo tumour growth
showed that this parameter regime might indeed be biologi-
cally relevant (figure 2), even when the tumour population
has not reached its carrying capacity. However, prominent
examples of in vitro cell line expansions demonstrate that
large differences between cellular death and birth rates
might impact the dynamics in a different way [42–44], and
in this case the replicator equation is a poor approximation
of the eco-evolutionary dynamics. We used a logistic
growth model that includes cell death. This system describes
both co-growth, as well as coevolution of two tumour cell
types. The choice of logistic growth is by no means unique,
but a simple, first-order form of non-uniform growth.
We report two major findings. First, a first-order approxi-
mation in death rates allows estimation of the stable manifold,
and reveals linear dependence on the apoptotic rate of the
more abundant cell type. Second, this knowledge can be used
to inform a zero-order approximation (in constant system
size) of the time to get arbitrarily close to equilibrium (1-fixation
time), which reveals that indeed the cellular turnover of the
dominant cell type near equilibrium governs the 1-fixation
time as the system slowly moves along the stable manifold.
This framework allowed us to examine the degree of the result-
ing variability in 1-fixation times based onpreviouslymeasured
in vivo tumour cell proliferation and death rates in the context of
competition between producers and non-producers of a growth
factor public good.
Various aspects of cancer cell population structure, such as
cellular differentiation, localization or spatial heterogeneity,
point to dynamic nonlinear size changes over time, especially
during treatment [63–66], and treatment can shift the evol-
utionary game [67]. Furthermore, selection mechanisms that
go beyond relative fitness differences play a role in our under-
standing of other biological and clinically relevant systems,
such as the hematopoietic system [68,69]. Hence, future model-
ling efforts that seek to apply evolutionary game theory toexplain complex cancer growth patterns need to precisely dis-
entangle complex interaction patterns between cells from the
overall growth kinetics of a tumour. Detailed understanding
of tumour growth kinetics is especially important in co-growing
populations, as we here show that the convergence towards an
equilibrium—which sets the time scale for potential treatment
and relapse effects—sensitively depends on the microscopic
cellular growth rates. The often performed, and mathemat-
ically convenient rescaling of time that leads to replicator
equations might eliminate effects that are crucial for under-
standing transitions between equilibria and describing
relevant time scales of tumour evolution.
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To investigate the stability of the fixed points of (2.3), we
denote the right-hand sides by
F(u, s) ¼ (f1(u) f2(u))u(1 u) 1 sK
 
and G(u, s) ¼ (f1(u) f2(u))su 1 sK
 
þ f2(u)s 1 sK
 
 ms
9>>>=
>>>;
ðA 1Þ
and calculate the Jacobian at the fixed point (u*, s*)
J(u, s) ¼ Fu(u
, s) Fs(u, s)
Gu(u, s) Gs(u, s)
 
, ðA 2Þ
where subscript denotes partial derivative with respect to u
and s.A.1. Boundary fixed points
For the boundary fixed points we find the following:
At (u*, s*) ¼ (0, 0), we find that
J(0, 0) ¼ f2(0) m 00 f1(0) f2(0)
 
ðA 3Þ
with eigenvalues l1 ¼ f1(0)2 f2(0) and l2 ¼ f2(0) 2 m. 0.
The last inequality holds because we assumed a positive
net growth rate for both cell types for all u [ [0, 1]. This
fixed point is therefore unconditionally unstable.
At (u*, s*) ¼ (0, 1), we find that
J(0, 1) ¼ f1(1) m 00 f2(1) f1(1)
 
ðA 4Þ
with eigenvalues l1 ¼ f1(1)2 f2(1) and l2 ¼ f1(1) 2 m. 0.
Again, the inequality holds because we assumed a positive
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9net growth rate for both cell types for all u[ [0, 1]. This fixed
point is therefore unconditionally unstable.
At (u*, s*) ¼ (1, K(1 2 m/f1(1)), we find that
J 1,K 1m
f1
ð1Þ
  
¼ m f1ð1Þ 
Kmðmf1ð1ÞÞð f1ð1Þf2ð1Þþf 01ð1ÞÞ
f1ð1Þ2
0 mf1ð1Þ ð f2ð1Þ  f1ð1ÞÞ
!
with eigenvalues l1 ¼ (m/f1(1))( f2(1)2 f1(1)) and l2 ¼ m 2
f1(1), 0. This implies that the fixed point is stable iff
f2(1), f1(1).
At (u*, s*) ¼ (0, K(1 2 m/f2(0)), we find that
J 0,K 1 m
f2ð0Þ
  
¼ m f2ð0Þ 
Kmðmf2ð0ÞÞð f2ð0Þf1ð0Þf 02ð0ÞÞ
f2ð0Þ2
0 mf2ð0Þ ð f1ð0Þ  f2ð0ÞÞ
!
with eigenvalues l1 ¼ (m/f2(0))( f1(0)2 f2(0)) and l2 ¼ m 2
f2(0), 0. This implies that the fixed point is stable iff
f1(0), f2(0). 170342A.2. Internal fixed points
Internal fixed points exist at points where f1(u*) ¼ f2(u*) for
0 , u* , 1. The corresponding s-coordinate is given by sol-
ving ds/dt ¼ 0 in terms of u to get s* ¼ K(12 m/f1(u*)).
The Jacobian at such a point is given by
J(u,s)
¼ s
u(f 01(u
) f 02(u)) 1 s

K
 
f1(u) 2f1(u
)s
K m
(f 01(u
) f 02(u))u s
u
K  s

Ku
 
0
 !
:
ðA5Þ
To say something about the stability of such a point we
need to investigate the signs of the eigenvalues of J. We do
this by looking at the sign of each matrix entry. For now,
we assume nothing about the sign of f10(u*) 2 f 02(u*) and
instead focus on the other factors in each matrix entry.
First, we see that
su 1 s

K
 
¼ su 1 K
K
1 m
f1ðuÞ
  
¼ s
um
f1ðuÞ . 0: ðA 6Þ
Further, we have
u
su
K
 s

K
 u
 
ðA 7Þ
¼ s
u2
K
 s
u
K
 u2 ðA 8Þ
¼ 1 m
f1ðuÞ
 
u2  1 m
f1ðuÞ
 
u  u2: ðA 9Þ
Here, 0  (12 m/f1(u*)) , 1 since f1(u) . m  0. This implies
that
1 m
f1(u)
 
u2  1 m
f1(u)
 
u  u2
¼  m
f1(u)u2
 1 m
f1(u)
 
u < 0, ðA 10Þsince both terms are negative. Lastly, we see that
f1ðuÞ  2f1ðu
Þs
K
 m ¼ f1ðuÞ 1 2Kð1 m=f1ðu
ÞÞ
K
 
 m
¼ f1ðuÞ 1þ 2mf1ðuÞ
 
 m , 0,
ðA 11Þ
since 1 þ 2m/f1(u*) . 0.
This implies that we can write the Jacobian as
J(u, s) ¼ ADf BCDf 0
 
, ðA 12Þ
where A . 0, B, 0, C , 0 and Df ¼ f10(u*) 2 f 02(u*). The
eigenvalues of the Jacobian are given by
l1,2 ¼ 12 (ADf +
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4BCDf þ A2Df2
q
): ðA 13Þ
Now if Df . 0 then ADf. 0, and
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4BCDf þ A2Df2p . ADf .
This implies that l1 . 0 and l2, 0, and hence the fixed
point (u*, s*) is unstable.
If on the other hand Df , 0 then there are three
possibilities, either (i) 4BCDf þ A2Df2 . 0 or (ii) 4BCDf þ
A2Df2 , 0 or (iii) 4BCDf þ A2Df2 ¼ 0. If (i) holds thenﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4BCDf þ A2Df2p < jADf j which implies that l1,2 , 0. If (ii)
is the case then
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4BCDf þ A2Df2p is complex and <(l1,2) ,
0. Lastly, if (iii) is the case then l1,2 ¼ ADf/2 , 0.
This shows that the stability of the stationary point at (u*,
s*) is fully determined by the sign of Df ¼ f10(u*) 2 f02(u*).
If Df. 0 the point is unstable and if Df , 0 then the point
is stable.Appendix B. Clonal population doubling rates
Here, all rates are given per day; in vivo data taken from
Marusyk et al. [27].
For LoxL3, we used the following population doubling
rates (net growth rates):
0:09
0:083
0:058
0:095
0:103
0:092
0:12
0:122
0:116
0:113
0:112
0:119
0:13
0:113
0:103
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
ðB 1Þ
and the following percentage of S-phase during cell cycle x:
0:512
0:424
0:385
0:349
0:21
0:202
0:195
0:198
0:191
0:137
9>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>;
ðB 2Þ
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10For IL11, we used the following population doubling
rates (net growth rates):
0:14
0:099
0:055
0:108
0:12
0:103
0:084
0:121
0:154
0:108
0:123
0:132
0:14
0:174
0:029
0:079
0:126
0:072
0:075
0:107
0:121
9>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>;
ðB 3Þ
and the following percentage of S-phase during cell cycle x:
0:192
0:21
0:207
0:224
0:228
0:259
0:309
0:354
0:385
9>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>;
ðB 4ÞFor CCL5, we used the following population doubling
rates (net growth rates):0:233
0:216
0:178
0:133
0:144
9>>=
>>>;
ðB 5Þand the following percentage of S-phase during cell cycle x:0:421
0:482
0:444
0:388
0:364
0:282
9>>>>=
>>>>;
ðB 6ÞThe distributions shown in figure 2 resulted from all pos-
sible pairs of these numbers to calculate a and m, equations
(3.10) and (3.11).
For generation of the in vitro distributions we used
normally distributed rates (truncated by 0), with a mean
death rate of 0.12 d21 (s.d. 0.0672) and a mean birth rate of
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